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AbstrAct: The article focuses on the need to start a comprehensive and 
multidisciplinary discussion about the specific interaction between AI and 
criminal justice, especially within the European context. Indeed, criminal 
law is considered, for several reasons, a realm in which computational 
modelling and AI cannot have a direct and relevant application. On the 
contrary, there is an urgent need to start a legal reflection about both 
the short- and long-term effects of such technology, that is reshaping 
all aspects of our social existence, justice included. The purpose of this 
article is to point out the most relevant risks in this scenario. There 
is no ambition to deliver answers but, rather, the need to set specific 
questions about if and how AI can be integrated into the criminal justice 
European systems. The author delays to a more comprehensive study 
any attempt of answering such questions.
Keywords: computational models; algorithms; decision-making process; 
stare decisis; judicial independence. 
resumo:	O	presente	artigo	analisa	a	necessidade	de	iniciar	uma	discussão	global	
e	multidisciplinar	em	relação	à	interseção	existente	entre	a	inteligência	artificial	
e	a	justiça	penal,	especialmente	no	contexto	europeu.	De	fato,	por	diferentes	
razões,	o	direito	penal	é	considerado	o	campo	no	qual	a	estrutura	computacional	
e	a	inteligência	artificial	não	podem	obter	uma	aplicação	direta	e	relevante.	Ao	
contrário,	constata-se	uma	urgente	necessidade	de	iniciar	uma	reflexão	global	
sobre	os	efeitos	em	curto	e	longo	prazo	de	tal	tecnologia,	que	está	remodelando	
todos	os	aspectos	de	nossa	existência	social,	a	começar	pela	justiça.	Nesse	
1 Full Professor of Criminal Procedure.
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cenário	delineado,	o	objetivo	deste	trabalho	é	evidenciar	os	riscos	mais	
relevantes	atualmente	existentes.	Contudo,	não	há	a	ambição	de	fornecer	
respostas,	mas,	ao	contrário,	expor	perguntas	específicas	sobre	se	e	como	
a	inteligência	artificial	possa	ser	integrada	nos	sistemas	europeus	de	justiça	
penal.	Remete-se	a	um	estudo	mais	completo	para	qualquer	tentativa	de	
responder	a	tais	questionamentos.	
PAlAvrAs-chAve: modelos computacionais; algoritmos; processo decisório; 
stare decisis; independência judiciária.
summAry: 1. Criminal law and the digital revolution. 2. Realism v. 
dystopianism. 2.1. The complexity of algorithmic decisions. 2.2. The 
protection of fundamental rights. 3. Criminal law v. prevention of 
crime. 3.1. The specificity of criminal law. 3.2. The specificity of 
Europe. 3.3. Specific implications of stare decisis. 4. Conclusions. 
Bibliography. 
1. criMinal law and thE digital rEvolution
In the common sense, ‘criminal law’ and ‘technology’ are 
considered, traditionally, non-reconcilable terms. Being the ultimate 
reaction of a jurisdiction to the aggression upon the core values of the 
society, criminal law is strictly embedded in the social culture. The topic 
has been dwelled abundantly in the European continental literature, from 
which we derive the idea that criminal law grasps national Kulturnomen, 
reproducing the general – or, at least, the most common – values of a 
population.2 In so far, Criminal Law tends to be, all over the world, a 
slow-changing factor, clearly because cultural shifts are slow-evolving 
phenomena: only settled down transformations can be ratified by the 
law, not only in the statutory-law legal systems. 
Although law is one of the means to influence people’s behaviour,3 
in democratic societies Criminal Law seems to be unfitted to drive 
2 Cadoppi Alberto, Il valore del precedente nel diritto penale. 2nd ed., Giappichelli, 
Torino, 2014, p. 22.
3 See Julia Black’s perspective on decentred regulation, in which aw is one out 
of many different systems to influence social behaviour: Black Julia, Critical 
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normative changes in social behaviour, rather to crystallise accomplished 
processes into sets of commands, reflecting an accepted framework of 
social values. Indeed, this is perfectly understandable: the harshness of 
penalties implies that the reject of a specific conduct is shared by a vast 
majority of the community, as much as the abolition of an offence (either 
statutory or judge-made) implies a general recognition of legitimacy 
in such conduct. If not, the legislator is imposing, non-democratically, 
values and rules that do not reflect common opinions and feelings. In 
continental criminal law this may indirectly impinge on one of the modern 
understandings of the rule of law, it is to say ‘requirability’ (esigibilità), 
that implies full understanding of the criminal behaviour and command by 
individuals: the latter could not be expected to avoid criminal behaviours 
if it is not possible for them to fully and properly grasp what the law 
considers to be criminal. 
However, it is undisputed that, in the last decades, the 
contemporary society witnessed a computational turn, that, now we all 
understand,4 is not only a breath-taking scientific advancement, a radical 
change in every professional realm, but, overall, is one of the most rapid, 
astonishing and wide-spread cultural changes ever occurred.5 This has 
been touching the foundations of our society6 in such a way to permeate 
even the steady core of criminal law. 
These preliminary remarks suggest two very general observations. 
Firstly, if criminal law is a sort of picture of the existing cultural context 
in a jurisdiction, there is no possibility for it to move ahead, or keep in 
track with, scientific progress, that is reshaping social habits. Scientific 
progress will always precede changes and amendments in criminal law. 
Reflections on Regulation, in Australian journal of legal Philosophy, 2002, vol. 
27, 1-36, p. 4
4 Even though some had clearly foreseen it, decades ago: Negroponte Nicholas, 
Being Digital, Hodder&Stoughton, London 1995; Kurzweil Ray, The Singular-
ity is Near, Viking, New York, 2005, p. 7, 8.
5 Floridi Luciano, The Fourth Revolution, OUP, Oxfrod 2017, passim.
6 See Garapon Antoine, Lassègue Jean, Justice digitale, PUF, Paris, 2018, espe-
cially 83 ff.: «la revolution numérique bouleverse tous les compartiments de 
l’existence collective».
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Secondly, the impact of the computational turn upon the 
realm of criminal justice turned out to be much wider than the area 
of ‘traditional’ cybercrime. Although the concept of cybercrime 
acknowledged at the beginning of this Century, as “computer-mediated 
activities which are either illegal or considered illicit by certain parties 
and which can be conducted through global electronic networks”7, 
may not be considered wrong in itself, the phenomenon proved much 
more articulated and sophisticated over the decades. Today, the legal 
research in that branch of criminal law evolved into an attempt to 
theorise the application of the classic legal categories to artificial 
intelligence entities.8 
Moreover, the digital revolution that globally occurred especially 
over the last decade is having repercussions upon every aspect of the 
administration of criminal justice, far behind the aspects that have been 
addressed by the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. The turn into a 
digital society is determining substantial changes not only in the context 
in which crime may occur, or in the way investigations can be carried 
on. Delivering justice is a human task and the sudden digital change into 
individuals’ life-style is affecting the way in which such task is performed,9 
7 See, among the first attempts to define the concept, Sieber Ulrich, Comput-
erkriminalitaet und Strafrecht, Carl Haymanns Verlag, Koeln, 1977, passim. 
Thomas, Loader, p. 3. Although both research and legislation evolved sig-
nificantly, it is still impossible to give one, unique and undisputed definition 
of cybercrime. “Cybercrime is a container term of convenience, describing 
a collection of acts or a field of criminal activity, rather than a single con-
cept”: Boister Nicholas, An introduction to Transnational Criminal Law, 2nd 
ed., OUP 2018, 188. Moreover, many other similar terms are often used, such 
as ‘computer crime’,’IT crime’... It has been said that the concept encompass-
es a whole range of terms which imply that the digital technology (not only 
computers) is an element of the offence. In this sense, internet connections 
are necessary elements, either for crimes against digital technologies and 
crime committed by means of digital technologies: Sieber Ulrich, Mastering 
Complexity in the Global Cyberspace: the Harmonisation of Computer-Related 
Criminal Law, in M. Delmas Marty, M. Pieth, U. Sieber (eds), Les Chemins de 
l’harmonisation pénale, 2008, 127 
8 Pagallo Ugo, Quattrocolo Serena, The Impact of AI on Criminal Law and its 
twofold procedures, in W. Barfield, U. Pagallo, Research Handbook on the Law 
of Artificial Intelligence, 2018, Edgar Elgar, p. 400
9 See the seminal work of Susskind Richard, The End of Lawyers?, OUP, 2008.
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impinging on the inner aspects of it, such as the decision-making process. 
These aspects will be analysed in the following paragraphs.
What has been briefly observed here can be considered the 
cause of an undisputed trend. If regulation in the criminal area tends 
to follow (not to precede) social changes, the digital turn occurred out 
of (and before) a specific legal framework. This implies that the digital 
advancement has been taking place in the absence of a back-ground 
research on the risks it may entail to the area of the core values of the 
society, usually protected by criminal law. Moreover, for a long time, the 
development of digital solutions overlooked the specific needs of criminal 
justice: existing (and pre-existing) technology dripped onto (almost 
every) criminal justice systems, providing availability of methods and 
solutions having been tailored for different purposes and not expressly 
fitted for the judicial use. 
In particular, the computational revolution meant availability of 
enormous quantity of free data, constantly generated by digital devices, 
powerful computational resources, being able to mine uncountable 
amounts of data in few seconds and ever cheaper storage costs.10 Such 
conditions (quintillions of data and cheap, unprecedented computational 
power) set the premises for offering, also to the criminal justice systems, 
useful facilities, even though not specifically tailored for the task.11 The 
digital turn provided not only full ranges of data, that can be used as 
evidence in criminal proceedings, but also new investigation systems, 
based on mining and analysing huge sets of available data (private or not; 
personal or not). Not only full digitalisation of courts’ decisions, with 
unrestricted access to any case-law, but also more or less sophisticated 
software for the analysis of it, to find patterns of predictability within 
judicial decisions. Moreover, the availability of an unprecedented amount 
of digital data shifted the attention from a code-based modelling system 
(code-driven regulation),12 totally deterministic - in which the discretion 
10 Katz Daniel M., Quantitative Legal Prediction, Or- How I Learned to Stop Wor-
rying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Indus-
try, in Emory Law Journal, 2013, 909-966, p. 916.
11 Floridi Luciano, cit., 41.
12 For the distinction between code-driven and data-driven regulation, see Hil-
debrandt Mireille, Algorithmic Regulation and the Rule of Law, Philosophical 
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is encrypted in the expert-designed code, establishing that If This, Than 
That – to a deep-learning modelling system, non-deterministic, in which 
the discretion lays in the choice of the data set (data-driven regulation) 
of legal texts to be used to train the system.13 
All this happened without a proper and effective confrontation 
between computer scientists, leading the sensational digital revolution, 
and criminal law experts. Also the legal literature confirms this impression, 
testifying of a growing attitude, especially in the U.S., of private law to focus 
on the theoretical challenges inherent the application of automation and 
artificial intelligence to the everyday-life, since Lawrence Solum’s seminal 
article in 1992,14 accompanied by a slower trend in criminal law, and in 
criminal procedure.15 To some extent, this matches with the premises 
from which I moved, it is to say, the connate feature of criminal law to 
following rather than preceding (or progressing with) social changes...16 
2. rEalisM v. dystopianisM
It Is essential, for the goal of this work, to understand how much 
of the mistrust and fears of (European) criminal lawyers towards the most 
recent digital instruments is due to the fact that they (allegedly) bring 
automated decision making processes into criminal justice or, rather, that 
Transactions of the Royal Society, 2018, p. 2, 3.
13 There is no room here for reconstructing the evolution of AI applied to legal 
issues. For a general overview, See Rissland Edwina, Ashley Kevin D., Loui 
R.P., AI and Law: A fruitful synergy, in Artificial Intelligence, 2003, Special 
Issue, 2.
14 Solum Lawrence, Legal Personhood for artificial intelligences, in North Carolina 
Law Review, 1992, p. 1231-1288
15 Nieva Fenoll Jordi, Inteligencia artificial y proceso judicial, Marcial Pons, Ma-
drid, 2018, 33 ff.
16 This attitude has been recently studied under the sociological point of view: 
see Christin Angèle, Algorithms in practice: Comparing web-journalism and 
criminal justice, in Big Data and Society, 2017 (July-December), p. 1-14. Based 
on his empirical research in American local criminal courts, the author con-
cludes that “in criminal justice innovation does not come with the glitter and 
appeal that it has in other sectors: it is often a source of uncertainty, as inno-
vation arrives without the vetting of precedent”. 
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they bring algorithmic decision making-processes into it. Let’s clarify 
this statement, that may sound slightly tautologic.
2.1. the comPlexity of AlGorithmic decisions
According to a quite common definition,17 “Algorithms need not be 
software: in the broadest sense, they are encoded procedures for transforming 
input data into a desired output, based on specified calculations. The procedures 
name both a problem and the steps by which it should be solved. Instructions 
for navigation may be considered an algorithm, or the mathematical formulas 
required to predict the movement of a celestial body across the sky”. Thus, 
algorithms, like syllogism – the most traditional instrument of judicial 
reasoning - have a normative function, establishing correlations between a 
starting set of elements or data, and a precise consequence. Which is the 
place, then, of algorithms in a judicial proceeding? They not necessarily are 
incorporated into a software and, moreover, not necessarily are operated 
automatically: in this sense, it is necessary to move from a conceptual 
clarification, distinguishing, between different levels of complexity. In 
fact, in my view, three aspects - validity of the scientific theory; translation 
of the theory into algorithmic language; fully automated operation of the 
algorithm – are involved in the application of computational modelling in 
judicial proceedings, and confusing them may be detrimental for finding 
effective solutions to the problems tackled here.
From a conceptual point of view, a judicial proceeding and, in 
particular, a criminal trial, is a process to establish whether and how a 
fact occurred (actus reus), if such fact has criminal relevance (mens 
rea), if the defendant perpetrated it and, in such case, provided that the 
individual is punishable, which is the just penalty to be imposed. This 
reconstruction follows a flow that is opposed to scientific investigation: 
while the latter moves form the observation of a set of conditions, trying 
17 Gillespie Tarleton, The relevance of Algorithms, in T. Gillespie, P. Boczkows-
ki, K. Foot, Media Technologies, MIT Press, Cambridge US, 2014, 167. Such 
definition has been recently adopted by the study delivered by the Coun-
cil of Europe on Algorithms and Human Rights: see https://rm.coe.int/
algorithms-and-human-rights-en-rev/16807956b5
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to explain which are the consequences deriving from them, the judicial 
decision moves from the consequences (the criminal act) backwards, 
trying to reconstruct the set of conditions that may have caused the 
fact. Causality has always been and still remains the core of criminal law, 
implying the existence of a universal scientific rule or, at least, a validated 
scientific theory, explaining, beyond any reasonable doubt, the narrative 
of the criminal fact.
How the recent astonishing achievements in IT and AI impact 
on such scenario? The answer implies, as said, three steps. 
The first layer of complexity encompasses the existence of a 
universal scientific rule or, at least a validated scientific theory establishing 
correlations between a set of factors and a precise consequence. 
Traditionally, it is said that causality should be preferably proved on 
the basis of a universal rule, establishing that, given A, B will always be 
the result. However, in light of the achievements of modern science, 
it is arguable that universal scientific laws do exist at all... In any case, 
when courts cannot rely on such strong correlation, they must recur 
to non-universal rules, allowing a certain margin of doubt, at least at 
the time being. It falls out of the scope to linger over the burgeoning 
literature focusing on the relationship between science and criminal law: 
however, although not being the focus of our speculations, this topic is 
entrenched into the general theme of AI and criminal proceedings, and 
cannot be overlooked. 
It is well-known that, the US Supreme Court delivered a decision 
in the 90’s of the last century that tends to be considered seminal in 
many jurisdictions, even outside the country, in civil-law legal orders. 
Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals18 established a list of basic 
standards that the courts, throughout the world, still apply in order to 
admit evidence based on scientific (or technical)19 theories. Thus, when 
reflecting upon the use of computational models in a judicial decision-
making process (either at the pre-trial stage, in trial or at sentencing), it 
must be acknowledged that the first layer of complexity is represented 
18 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92-102), 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
19 In fact, Kuhmo Tire extended the Daubert test to technical evidence (Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael (97-1709) 526 U.S. 137 (1999)).
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by the underpinning scientific theory. A computational model must be 
rooted into a theory and such theory must meet minimum requirements 
of validation, according to the peers’ community. 
The second layer of complexity is consequential, because the 
results of such scientific theory may be encoded into an algorithm. 
Acknowledging the definition given above, algorithms design a normative 
procedure that moves from a set of data towards a desired output, excluding 
subjective intuitions and arbitrariness from the process. Insofar, it 
represents a mathematic model,20 that can be operated by a human being, 
even in a criminal proceeding, provided that it is based on a sufficiently 
validated theory and that such theory has been correctly encoded into 
the algorithm. These two requirements are crucial. In fact, a ‘reverse 
control’ on coding is fundamental, because the possibility of reviewing, 
discussing, challenging the results of an algorithm is a basic condition for 
a fair decision process and, thus, for a fair criminal proceeding, compliant 
with fundamental human rights.
The third layer of complexity lays in the fact that the digital turn 
established two basic and ideal conditions to boost the use of algorithms 
in every kind of decision-making process. In fact, the stunning amount 
of data produced (for free) daily by digital devices and the extraordinary 
and unprecedented computational power now available at a very low 
cost, represent the ideal context in which algorithms can deliver the 
most effective results.21 An algorithm operated by a human being will 
process a small amount of data, in a relatively long time, delivering few 
outputs. The same algorithm, operated through a computational model will 
mine uncountable data in few seconds, delivering an enormous amount 
of outputs. In this sense, “the use of robots and AI, therefore, is just a 
special case of the Algorithmic Society. Big Data, too, is just a feature of 
20 For an easily-accessible definition of ‘models’, see O’Neil Cathy, Weapons of 
Math Destruction, Penguin, Allen Lane, London, 2016, § 7.12: to create a mod-
el implies making choices about what is important to include into it or not.
21 See, in general, the remark by Zedner Lucia, The inescapable insecurity of se-
curity technologies?, in K. Franko Aas, H. Oppen Gundhus, H. Mork Lomel, 
Technologies of Insecurity. The surveillance of everyday life, Rutledge-Cav-
endish, Oxon, 2009, p. 257-270 p. 257: “Enormous trust is placed in the ca-
pacity of technology to surmount the gravest challenges to our well-being 
and happiness”. “Techno-credulity is widespread”.
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the Algorithmic Society. Big Data is the fuel that runs the Algorithmic 
Society… To vary Kant’s famous statement, algorithms without data are 
empty; data without algorithms are blind”.22
Thus, it is possible to argue that, on the basis of the above-mentioned 
conditions, algorithms, in their essence of normative, mathematical 
statements/relations, are gaining momentum over subjectivity at the 
present day23. An algorithmic decision–making process is (or ought 
to be) opposite an arbitrary one, granting – theoretically - objectivity, 
accessibility and, ultimately, fairness.24 However, accessibility implies 
transparency and transparency is not an innate quality of algorithms. On 
the contrary, a substantial literature has been focusing on the problem of 
algorithms’ opacity, a condition in which the encoded procedure cannot 
be validated ex post, and thus its results cannot be (even not) explained 
(and, consequently, not justified).25
Having clarified these concepts, it is possible to set a first 
cornerstone of this study. The need for accessibility is the quintessential 
aspect in the discourse about the use of algorithm in decision-making 
processes, both in private and public context. Such accessibility, or 
transparency, acquires specific implications when it comes to the judicial 
decision-making process and, in particular, to the criminal trial one. 
Thus, transparency is the constant issue behind the discourse about the 
application of algorithms and AI systems to criminal justice. Reflecting on 
the meaning of such concept, a very crucial distinction has been drawn 
between explanation and justification.26 In this sense, much depends, in 
22 Balkin Jack M., The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, in SSRN 
2016, at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2890965
23 Plesničar Monika M., Sugman Stubbs katja, Subjectivity, Algorithms and the 
Courtroom, in A. Zavrsnik (ed.), Big Data, Crime and, Social Control, Rutledge, 
Abingdon, 2018, (ebook) § 22.37. 
24 The validity of such argument relies on the possibility to really eradicate 
human biases rather than camouflage them with technology: C. O’Neil, cit., 
§ 7.38.
25 Geslevich Packin Nizan, Lev-Aretz yafit, Learning algorithms and discrimina-
tion, in W. Barfield, U. Pagallo, Research Handbook on the Artificial Intelligence 
and Law, Elgar, Cheltenam, 2019, 88 ff.
26 See recently Hildebrandt Mireille, Algorithmic Regulation, cit., 2. (The top-
ic has been deeply debated with regard to the provision of art. 22 GDPR, 
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the first instance, on the precision of the scientific theory underpinning 
it and, in the second instance, on the clarity of the language used to 
translate it into a mathematic formula. To comply with the requirement 
of explanation, it seems to me that the latter quality is sufficient: a clear 
mathematic language allows an ex post reviewer to understand how the 
process evolved from the inputs to the outputs. However, to satisfy the 
need of justification, the underpinning scientific theory must be valid 
enough to provide a causality relationship between the set of input data 
and the outputs (‘validity’ is intended here in the sense provided by the 
US Supreme Court in the mentioned case of Daubert). 
In the light of the previous arguments, it is possible to set also a 
second cornerstone for this enquiry. Regardless of the different realms 
of the criminal proceeding in which computational models and AI could 
be applied, the general impression is that, allowing for the use of the 
most recent digital achievements in criminal proceedings may deprive 
courts of their discretion (and the parties of their rights). Delving on this 
common opinion, two main aspects must be taken into consideration. 
First. Irrespectively the correctness of such opinion, what should 
be ultimately suspected of depriving judges of their power is not ‘the 
machine’, rather the algorithm. As said, the normative approach of 
mathematical modelling is supposed to objectivise a decision process, 
reducing non-objective criteria or indexes, based on personal culture, 
biases, shortcuts27 and contingent conditions. However – second - the 
algorithmic reasoning is opposed to arbitrariness, not necessarily to 
discretion. In this sense, the aspiration of introducing algorithms in all 
sorts of decision-making processes is understandable. In the public sector, 
about automated individual decision making, including profile: see Wachter 
Sandra, Mittlestadt Brent, Floridi Luciano, Why a Right to Explanation of Au-
tomated Decision-Making Does not Exist in the General Data Protection Regula-
tion, International Data Privacy and Law, 2017, p. 1 -47).
27 There is extensive literature on heuristics in judicial decision making pro-
cess. See, in general, the leading text of Kahneman Daniel, Slovic Paul., Tver-
sky Amos (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, New York 
1982, Cambridge University Press.; more recently, Cevolani Gustavo, Crupi 
Vincenzo, Come ragionano i giudici: razionalità, euristiche e illusioni cogni-
tive, Criminalia 2017, p 181 ff, 182.
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such ambition is urged by the need (and the duty, in some jurisdiction)28 
of granting an impartial and fair administration, in any branch of it. In 
the private sector, excluding arbitrariness in strategic decision, such as 
hiring one applicant or another, may prove essential in gaining more 
profit.29 Nevertheless, two variables must be retained. On the one hand, 
algorithms can help in achieving such legitimate goals at the conditions 
mentioned above (first cornerstone): they must underpin a valid theory 
and be transparent, otherwise they cannot provide impartiality or profit. 
On the other hand, allowing for the use of algorithms does not imply 
taking out any discretion from the decision process:30 there is room for 
the rulers to regulate the interaction between algorithms and human 
intuition in a way that does not deprive the process of discretion. This 
argument is particularly valuable in those contexts in which fundamental 
rights – such as the one to a fair trial - are in jeopardy and the outcomes of 
the decision-making process may impact significantly on the individuals’ 
condition (such as the nature and the amount of penalty, depriving them 
of liberty or even life). Someone may argue that discretion is a risk, rather 
than a value, when fundamental rights are at stake... Actually, other forms 
of intelligence, like the artificial one, proved to perform better than the 
human intuition, in many areas… could this be the case also with judicial 
decision? Preliminarily, it is worth asking if and how it is possible to scale 
‘better performances’ in judging human criminal behaviour. What would 
‘better’ mean? ‘More consistent’? Of course, basic systems of AI can grant 
high levels of consistency… However, it is questionable if and how far 
such consistency is a value in criminal proceedings. In fact, as said, courts 
ruling upon an individual’s criminal liability do not perform a scientific 
or technical process. Judging, in general, and sentencing, in particular, 
are human tasks not just because they are performed by humans,31 but 
because they are intended to be received, understood and accepted by 
28 See, e.g. Art. 97 of the Italian Constitution, providing for the duty of impar-
tiality in every branch of the public administration.
29 With specific regard to law firms, see Katz Daniel M., cit., p. 934.
30 See Morozov Evgeny, To Save Everything, Click Here, Penguins, Allen Lane, 
London, 2013, § 11.30 (ebook)
31 See Plesničar Monika M., Sugman Stubbs Katja, Subjectivity, cit., § 22.14.
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the community:32 crime is a social construct33 and the social acceptance 
of a decision, rather than consistency, is the ultimate task of delivering 
justice. In this sense, the need for discretion in all the areas of judicial 
decision (criminal liability, penalty, but also admission and evaluation 
of evidence) is inherent to the judicial function itself. 
For these reasons, the legal discussion must be framed in such 
terms to detect (and avoid) the conditions in which the use of algorithms 
can suppress discretion, along with arbitrariness. For example, such 
situation may happen to occur when algorithms are operated in a totally 
automated way, without any human intervention. Similar conditions may 
prove to be detrimental for the fairness of criminal proceedings and, 
in particular, for the rights of the defence. But this is not a necessary 
condition. The suppression of the judge’s and parties’ prerogatives may 
be a consequence of the characteristics of the algorithm in itself and 
not of the fact that it is performed by a machine. This distinction is not 
barely formal. It is part of the necessary premises to address the topic 
of computational model, AI and criminal law under a legal point of 
view, because it is inherent to the definition of the risks that need to be 
considered here. 
To summarise, algorithms, incorporated into computational 
models or not, are pushing on our systems of criminal justice, pledging 
high rates of efficiency. However, as said, technical and scientific 
efficiency is a parameter that does not belong to justice. Thus, reliability, 
accuracy, trustworthiness of such instruments should not be measured 
only in the terms of computer science:34 the same concepts have 
specific meanings in the realm of criminal justice, and they cannot be 
overlooked. For these reasons, the existing digital methods, having been 
applied in criminal proceedings - with or without a proper framework 
32 See the very famous Introduction of Cardozo Benjamin N., The nature of the 
Judicial Process, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1921, p. 10: “What is that 
I do when I decide a case? (…) Some principle, however unavowed and inar-
ticulate and subconscious, has regulated the infusion”.
33 See Spector Malcom, Kitsuse John I., Constructing Social Problems, 2nd ed., 
Routlege, London, 2000.
34 Zavrsnik Aleš, cit.,§ 21.2 warns about the fact that “what counts as ‘proper’, ef-
fective and efficient police work and judicial decision-making has changed”...
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of legal regulation - of many jurisdictions, should be reviewed from 
the legal perspective.35 
2.2. the Protection of fundAmentAl riGhts
The European countries have strong constitutional traditions. 
Based on this, the Council of Europe was able to promote the signature 
and the ratification of the European Convention of Human Rights and 
the acceptance by the member States of the individual application to the 
European Court of Human rights. Moreover, the common constitutional 
traditions are considered a legally binding source of the EU law. Many of 
those constitutions, along with the ECHR and the Charter of fundamental 
Rights of the EU, regulate justice, often setting forth specific principles 
referred to criminal justice. In this sense, the ECHR, the EU law (within the 
area of the Union competence), and the national constitutions represent 
a legal filter for any attempt to introduce the use of computational means 
into criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, the approach to the matter must 
be neutral: scholars must not move from the prejudice that the use of 
such means is inconstant with fundamental rights… The purpose of a 
useful study is to assess whether their application may violate some of 
the principles enshrined in the ECHR. To this aim, it is crucial to establish 
a shift of perspective: as said, computational models and instruments, 
software and programs are usually assessed in terms of technical reliability, 
scaling their performance on the basis of the aspiration to exclude errors 
or inaccuracy. However, for the reasons summarised above, the endeavour 
to hybridise (criminal) justice with such means cannot respond to the sole 
criterion of efficiency. Actually, efficiency, per se, is even not expressly 
mentioned in Art. 6 ECHR. On the contrary, such means should be 
confronted to the traditional and fundamental principles regulating 
law enforcement, both in investigation, in trial and in sentencing. The 
fundamental guarantees set forth by the ECHR, such as the right to private 
and family life, the presumption of innocence, the equality of arms, 
must be used as parameters to assess the lawfulness of using automated 
35 Zavrsnik Aleš, cit., § 21.28: These methodologies, are not developed for the 
study of society, in the manner that statistics in modernity was.
1533
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, vol. 5, n. 3, p. 1519-1554, set.-dez. 2019.
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v5i3.290 |
instruments within criminal proceedings or, better, the conditions for a 
lawful application of it. 
Such theoretical approach seems crucial to establish a useful legal 
discussion in these terms, before rulers fall into the ‘digital fascination’. For 
the reasons that will be sketched out hereinafter, there is a considerable gap 
between a certain number of common-law countries and Europe, and the 
latter is still in the phase of ‘approaching the topic’. Enumerating the list 
of digital solutions already adopted in other jurisdictions, acknowledging 
their existence and, maybe, their performing rates is not enough. It is 
important to address the problem under the right point of view, that 
seems to be that of fundamental rights: are such instruments compatible 
with the presumption of innocence? Are they respectful of the equality 
of arms? Are all of them compliant with the protection of the right to 
private and family life within the context of criminal proceedings? An 
inaccurate analysis of the problem, may lead to endorse computational 
solutions that, in the long term, may prove even highly inconstant with 
the essence of fair trial. Allowing such situation would be painful for 
individuals and, redressing it, extremely challenging for rulers.36 It is 
better to adopt a neutral approach and reflect on it before flaws hit the 
fundamental rights of individuals.
3. criMinal law v. prEvEntion of criME
Based on the previous remarks, it is possible to list some specific 
topics on which the criminal law scholarship should focus.
Frist and foremost, the union of ‘AI’ and ‘Criminal Law’ suggests 
a dystopic scenario of extremely intrusive means of surveillance, aimed 
to prevent crime.37 However, surveillance and prevention fall out of 
the scope of Criminal Law. The latter regulates the elements of crime 
36 In a general sense, see Morozov Evgeny, cit., § 11.27: “who would be crazy 
enough to oppose the march of science and suggest that perhaps some of 
those products need to be modified?
37 See Franko Aas Katia, Oppen Gundhus Helena, Mork Lomel Heidi, Introduc-
tion, in K. Franko Aas, H. Oppen Gundhus, H. Mork Lomel, Technologies of 
Insecurity. The surveillance of everyday life, cit., p. 3.
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and the consequences of its perpetration. Thus, a criminal proceeding 
may exist only after a crime has (allegedly) occurred. In this sense, this 
enquiry is limited to the use of computational models and AI in criminal 
proceedings and not in policing.
Nevertheless, more and more LEAs are equipped with software 
predicting where and when crimes are more likely to occur.38 Recently, 
the Italian main newspapers reported with great fanfare the introduction 
of the so called “X Law” software, enabling a more accurate patrolling of 
the neighbourhoods, on the basis of a set of statistic data. Instruments of 
‘predictive policing’39 have been used since a long in many jurisdictions.40 
Setting aside the fascination for it41 (the Italian journals reported the 
immediate result of an on-site arrest), such software already demonstrated 
their limits, ‘self-realising’ their predictions: in fact, indicating an area 
as the potential site of crime, will per se raise the arrests rates, as more 
LEA units will be monitoring that area. However, the effectiveness of 
such systems is not an object of this study, because this is not an area of 
criminal law, and even less of criminal proceedings. 
Inherently, the area of prevention of crime and policing – deeply 
intermingled with intelligence - tends to escape to rigid and precise 
regulation42. Constraining it into strict boundaries would condemn it 
38 See. Zavrsnik Aleš, cit.
39 See extensively, Wilson Dean, Algorithmic Patrol, in A. Zavrsnik (ed.), Big 
Data, Crime and, Social Control, cit., § 19.3
40 See the trial results of Mohler George, Short M.B., Malinowski Sean, Johnson 
Mark, Tita G.E., Bertozzi Andrea L.,, Brantingham P.J., Randomised controlled 
field trials of predictive policing, in Journal of the American Statistics Associa-
tion, 2015, vol. 510, p. 1399-1411, of an algorithm based on data from Amer-
ican and British jurisdictions about different kind of crimes. In 21 months of 
testing the algorithm against specialised analysts, the results showed the first 
being between 1,4 and 2<2 times more accurate than the latter. The group 
was not totally independent, as two of the members co-founded the compa-
ny that would commercialise the algorithm, while others served as external 
counsels for the company.
41 Zavrsnik Aleš, cit., § 21.13 devotes a paragraph to “crime control and the 
fascination with numbers”. 
42 However, some countries, like Italy, have a long tradition in providing pre-
ventive measures, not based on an alleged crime, but actually to avoid the 
commission of it...
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to be less effective… As prevention is a different and autonomous area 
of criminal justice, the attention here is focused on the specificity of 
criminal law.
3.1. the sPecificity of criminAl lAw
Many of the reasons justifying a criminal law approach to the topic 
have been anticipated in §§ 1 and 2. Because of the values underpinning 
this area of law, much attention has been paid to it, in the last decades, 
especially in the second World War aftermath. The idea of recognising the 
fair trial as a fundamental human right, with some of the most important 
international bills of rights - such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the several regional conventions on human rights – 
was crucial in strengthening the culture of procedural guarantees, within 
any branch of the jurisdiction. However, it is with regard to criminal 
proceeding that the rulers developed the most articulated list of guarantees, 
establishing the presumption of innocence, but also a very detailed 
list of minimum standards, deeply influencing the shape of national 
jurisdictions: from the basic right to access to justice, to the right of having 
free linguistic assistance, the provisions of the ICCPR and, in particular 
of the ECHR (thanks to the living-instrument doctrine43 adopted by 
the European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter, ECtHR), set forth a 
relatively strict frame for national legislators. It falls out of the scope of 
this study to linger over the effective level of harmonisation achieved 
by the ECHR and by the burgeoning case-law of the Court on criminal 
fair trail: actually, the real domain of criminal law matters reaches far 
behind Art. 6, covering, in the broadest sense, also art. 7 (nulla poena sine 
lege), art. 8 (right to private and family life), art. 5 (right to liberty and 
43 Based on a precise reference inserted in the preamble of the Convention - 
according to which, “the object and the purpose” of the ECHR is not only the 
maintenance, but also the “further implementation” of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, the Court started promoting (since the case of Golder v. 
UK,21.2.1975) an evolutionary approach, rejecting any originalistic theory in 
the interpretation of the document. See, Emmerson Ben, Ashworth, Andrew 
Macdonald Alison, Human rights and Criminal Justice, 3rd ed, Sweet and Max-
well, London, 2012. p. 82. 5
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security) and arts. 2 and 3, in their procedural aspect (duty to set up an 
effective investigation on potential violations, respectively, of the right 
to life and of the prohibition of torture). On the one hand, the wording 
of the convention regulates, itself, a range of aspects related to the whole 
criminal proceeding, from the investigations and pre-trial detention, to 
the execution of penalties, encompassing the principle of legality. And 
even though the charter does not provide for a precise statute of criminal 
evidence, Art. 6 (and 8) ECHR establish some crucial benchmarks in 
the collection and evaluation of it, considered by the ECtHR itself,44 the 
realm of national legislators’ discretion. On the other hand, as far as the 
States recognised the right of individuals to apply the Commission - and, 
eventually, the Court – the Strasbourg case-law started building the wider 
scheme of a convention-compliant criminal proceeding, that any national 
ruler must take into account. 
The reasons for such comprehensive attention for the criminal 
jurisdiction are many. In § 1 I highlighted some of the most general features 
of criminal law, based on which it is possible to argue that criminal law 
and criminal proceeding can easily be turned into an offensive instrument, 
punishing and crushing the opponents, the enemies, the weaker, the non-
mainstreamers.45 In fact, basically, criminal law is about the legitimate 
use of violence by the State.46 So far, a modern bill of rights cannot 
overlook the importance of setting strong and precise limitations to the 
rulers’ discretion to regulate criminal affairs, in order to prevent such 
illiberal outcomes.
Moreover, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, ten 
years ago, the European Union experienced both a profound reform of 
its legal sources and the rationalisation of its competence, acquiring a 
much detailed and penetrating power in criminal matters, substantive and 
procedural. Both art. 82 and 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
44 See, recently, ECtHR, Svetina v. Slovenia, 22.5.2018.
45 See MacCorkmick Neil, Garland David, Sovereign States and Vengeful Victims: 
the Problem of the Right to Punish, in A. Ashworth, M. Wasik (eds.), Essays in 
Honour of Andrew von Hirsch, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 11-29, p. 28.
46 Duff Antony, Garland David, Introduction: Thinking about Punishment, in R.A. 
Duff, D. Garland (eds.), A Reader on Punishment, Oxford University Press, 
1994, p. 2 ss.
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EU (hereinafter, TFEU) establish that, by means of directives, according 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, the Union can lay down minimum 
rules about: (art. 82§2), mutual admissibility of evidence in criminal 
proceedings; rights of individuals in criminal proceedings; rights of victims 
of crime; (art. 83), the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in 
the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension and 
the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States 
if it proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union 
policy. As a result, in the past decade, a long list of directives was adopted 
under art. 82§2 to strengthen the procedural rights of the individuals in 
criminal proceedings. Some of the guarantees already provided by the 
ECHR have been reiterated in the legal vest of directives - submitted to 
the interpretation of the CJEU – that the members States have the duty 
to implement in their jurisdiction, under the consequences provided for 
in art. 258 and 259 TFEU.
Thus, within the European institutional environment, much 
attention is paid to the criminal proceedings, as many fundamental 
rights concentrate in it, the accused person’s ones and the victims’ ones, 
at the same time. For this reason, the discourse about the introduction 
of algorithmic, computational models and AI in the area of criminal 
proceeding is submitted to the ‘filter’ of such a rich core of fundamental 
rights. Behind it, lays the filter of the national regulation, that in some 
cases is even stricter. In fact, as said, at the national level, the fairness of 
the proceedings may acquire also another meaning: beyond the interest of 
the defendant (or the victim), it may be considered an objective guarantee, 
not only satisfying the defendants’ personal interest (actually, they could 
consider more consistent with their strategy to waive all their rights and 
accept unfair trial), but also the general interest to the objective fairness in 
the administration of criminal justice. Despite the opinion and the strategy 
of the defendant, the system cannot allow unfair criminal proceedings, 
as this would be inconsistent with its own institutional nature.47
Having excluded the area of policing and prevention of crime 
from the scenario considered here, and highlighted the existence of a 
47 See Ferrua Paolo, Giustizia del processo, giustizia della decisione, Diritto penale 
e processo, 2015, 1201 ss.
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comprehensive framework of European guarantees surrounding the whole 
criminal proceeding, it is worth pointing out which aspects of the latter 
may be more closely affected by the use of computational modelling and 
AI. Having regard, especially, to the northern American experience - that 
seems to be the one incorporating most extensively algorithmic and 
digital solutions in the realm of criminal justice – such tools impact on 
many phases of the criminal proceeding, from the investigation to the 
sentencing and the execution of penalties. In the American experience, 
there seem to be patterns repeating in different stages of the proceeding. 
In fact, within the considerable span of a proceeding, algorithmic and 
computational models seem to respond to two main tasks. 
First task: a more effective collection of information, to be 
used either in the investigation and/or as evidence in the trail stage. 
In this sense, the digital turn offered the LEAs and prosecutors many 
advantages: an uncountable amount of data to be hacked; much more 
intrusive hacking systems; a range of information provided by the IoT, 
‘ready’ to be used as evidence in trial. This is the area in which the 
European criminal justice scenario has been more deeply penetrated 
by digital solutions. In fact, in many jurisdictions, LEAs simply started 
using hacking systems to replace traditional interceptions, searches and 
seizures, almost without a specific regulation. The LIBE Committee 
(Civil Liberties, Justice and Home affaires) of the European Parliament 
commissioned a study about Legal Frameworks for Hacking by Law 
Enforcement: Identification, Evaluation and Comparison of Practices, 
delivered in March 2017 by the European Parliament’s Policy Department 
for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs. The conclusions of the 
very comprehensive document focuses the attention on the same crucial 
aspect highlighted here above. On the one hand, the “discussions that 
have addressed this topic to some extent have primarily focused on the 
surveillance activities of the security and intelligence services”, and not 
on the judicial aspect of hacking. Moreover, “these international-level 
discussions start form the point of view where surveillance activities are 
necessary and simply require governing laws” [...]: “however, the using 
of hacking techniques and the implementation of specific legislation at 
the national level should be subject to EU and international fundamental 
rights principles. [...] The right for law enforcement agencies to use 
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hacking techniques should not be assumed but must be deemed necessary 
within the specific context of a Member State”. 
Traditionally, this is the area of interaction between criminal 
proceeding and individual’s sphere of private life. In fact, although being 
extensively protected by one of the most comprehensive regulations in the 
world (the GDPR), privacy is not an absolute right, even in the European 
context. When compared with other fundamental interests of the society, 
such as (in this case) the prosecution of crime, it can be lawfully limited: 
privacy has its own dimension within criminal proceedings and this is 
regulated both by the ECHR and the EU law. However, using digitally 
generated (or hacked) evidence in criminal proceedings may also hinder 
another fundamental right, to a fair trial: actually, it may violate both 
the right to a fair trail and the one to private life. In fact, the opacity of 
the algorithms regulating hacking instruments and other digital devices, 
generating evidence, may prevent the defence from challenging the 
accuracy and reliability of it. This can hamper one of the basic aspects 
of the fair trial, it is to say the equality of arms, that, in its basic meaning 
implies the right of the parties to challenge the opponent’s evidence, not 
in a theoretical, but in an effective way.48 
Second task: algorithms and computational models proved useful 
in several stages of the judicial decision-making process. On the one hand, 
based on their stunning computational power, such instruments can 
rapidly mine quintillions of statistic data, helping to establish correlations 
between the individual’s and a social group’s behaviour and, apparently, 
to predict future actions, such as violations of bail conditions or parole 
or recidivism. On the other hand, thanks to that very same feature, open 
access digital instruments allow for the complete accessibility of any 
judicial decision delivered within a jurisdiction and for the searching 
by key-words (or concepts, with regard to the most recent technical 
achievements)49. Designers of such software claim that the result is 
48 Pagallo Ugo, Quattrocolo Serena, The Impact of AI on Criminal Law and its 
twofold procedures, in W. Barfield, U. Pagallo, Research Handbook on the Arti-
ficial Intelligence and Law, Elgar, Cheltenham, 2019, 400.
49 Sobowale Julie, How artificial Intelligence is transforming the Legal profession, 
ABA Journal, April 2016, referring to NexLP (private company leading the 
sector) most recent products.
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predictability of the decisions, taking into account any individual judge’s 
variables inclinations. In the US, specialised journals often refer to the so 
called ‘science of quantitative legal prediction’. For example, it has been 
said that trying to predict the Supreme Court decisions seems to be one of 
the most popular hobbies, at least among politicians and journalists, with 
very scarce success... But, as the impact of the Court’s decisions is crucial 
for the society as a whole, it seems worth producing accurate models, 
scoring very high levels of accuracy50… Quantitative legal prediction 
claims to respond with a stunning approximation, to such need.
In this sense, it is possible to argue that the digital turn is promoting 
predictability as the major feature and aim, at the same time, of criminal 
justice. On the one hand, predicting defendants’ future behaviour; on 
the other hand, predicting judges’ behaviour and decisions. However, 
the question is whether predictability has an ‘autonomous concept’51 
within the realm of criminal law that does not align with the popular 
meaning of the term. 
3.1.1 Moreover, the issue is also related to some of the most 
crucial and essential aspects of any legal order: the statutory nature of 
a jurisdiction (impinging on the relationship between judges and the 
law); the structure of judiciary (regulating the different levels of the 
jurisdiction and the relationship between lower and superior courts and 
the role of the latter in assuring the uniformity of the interpretation); 
50 See Katz Daniel M., Bommarito Michael J. II, Blackman Josh, A general Ap-
proach for Predicting the Behaviour of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
in SSRN, 16.1.2017
51 The term ‘autonomous concept’ is familiar to the European readers, having 
been extensively used by both the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. The term indicates that, in the con-
text of these two domains, a notion, applying also in the national jurisdic-
tions, encompasses (also) different aspects and elements. The most known 
example is the notion of ‘criminal charge’, having been considered by the 
court an autonomous concept since the case of Engel and others v. The Ned-
erland, 23.11.1976. For an interesting approach to ‘autonomous concepts’ see 
G. Letsas, in European Journal of International Law, 2004, 279-305. As said, 
also the Court of Luxembourg often applies the interpretative tool of auton-
omous concepts (sometimes overlapping with those developed by the Court 
of Human Rights).
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the value of the precedent (imposing boundaries on the judges’ freedom 
to divert from it); the concept of ‘similarity’ between two cases (being 
the condition to apply stare decisis)… The general accessibility to 
the whole body of decisions in a jurisdiction may seriously impact 
on two basic characters of the latter. On the one hand, legal systems 
being not regulated by stare decisis – like the majority of the civil-law 
countries – may witness a shift towards a different pattern, imposing 
on the courts a duty of specific reasoning in case of over-ruling. The 
social expectations for full consistency with the ‘predicted decision’ 
may urge judges to feel uncomfortable in departing form it, seriously 
impinging on the independence of judiciary.52 Moreover, mining a 
mass of data, predictive models may not distinguish between lower 
courts and superior courts’ decisions, hampering the institutional 
structure of justice itself... These are all crucial aspects in determining 
the concept and the value of predictability, being deeply rooted in the 
most inherent aspects of the common-law and civil-law traditions. As 
such, they affect all branches of a legal system, and not only criminal 
justice. However, the concept of predictability has a specific meaning 
within the modern conception of the principle of legality. The theory 
of predictability of criminal commands and penalties moves from 
the liberal theory of criminal law and finds a beacon in the famous 
Bentham’s critique of the British judges.53 Men can understand the 
consequences of their behaviour and are able to self-determine: for these 
reasons, the rulers must put them in the condition to foresee, clearly 
and surely, the penal consequences of a behaviour before putting it 
into action.54 It is worth asking whether this is the very same aim and 
function promised by computational models mining and analysing all 
the decisions in a jurisdiction, searching for patterns of correspondence 
between decisions and judges’ behaviour. 
These arguments confirm the specificity of the realm of criminal 
justice within the general context of ‘legal AI’. Criminal law and criminal 
52 See the European Ethical Charter for the Use of AI in the systems of justice. 
Annex II, delivered in December 2018 by the CEPEJ (Council of Europe).
53 Bentham Jeremy, Works, V, edited by J. Bowring, Edinburgh 1843.
54 Cadoppi Alberto, Il valore del precedente, cit., p. 65 s.
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proceeding are a branch of regulation in which the issue of the use of 
computational modelling and AI need to be addressed specifically. 
3.2 the sPecificity of euroPe
A second aspect of specificity is geographical. There exist a lag 
between the US (and some others common-law jurisdictions, such as some 
Australian ones)55 and Europe, under the view-point of massive reliance 
on digital solutions in justice systems.56 Over two decades,57 new branches 
of research and scholarship developed in the US, often bringing computer 
scientists and, in particular, modelling developers, to see a potentially 
rich new market for their software in the realm of justice...58 and Europe 
seems to be a virgin soil.59 In fact, at the time being, “the use of predictive 
tools in criminal trials is very rare in Europe”60 as many other algorithmic 
instruments are,61 and there is room to set up a legal discussion, before 
the market rules overarch any effective possibility for it.
55 See the Australian Report in the study, A framework for hacking by law en-
forcement, cit., p. 111. 
56 For a complete overview of American leading law-firms having turned to 
technological resources for the accomplishment of traditional tasks, Li Vic-
tor, Techtrekkers, ABA Journal, April 2016, p. 37-43.
57 See Sobowale Julie, Beyond Imagination, ABA Journal, April 2016, p. 47-53, 
p. 47: “the future of legal professions started twenty years ago”, referring to 
Discovery Cracker, the first software for legal researches. 
58 The initiative of pinpointing instances of AI in judicial systems almost came 
from the private sector: see, European Ethical Charter for the use of AI in 
judicial systems and their environment. Appendix I, p. 14.
59 See Sobowale Julie, How artificial intelligence, cit., reporting Adam Nguyen, 
EBrevia’s co-founder (supplying legal software based on machine learning), 
interest in covering the European market.
60 See, European Ethical Charter, cit., p. 37: with the exception of HART (Harm 
Assessment Risk Tool), being under experimentation at the moment in some 
UK jurisdiction, there is no knowledge of other similar instruments. 
61 See, e.g. S.F. Ward, Doing It with Data, in ABA Journal, September 2018, p. 
38, about the so-called Priori system, a platform that pairs attorneys with 
clients based on detailed experience information. The service is free for the 
attorneys who agree to discount 25% hourly rates, while clients pay 10% of 
the reduction to Priori.
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As to the reasons for such a lag, they seem to be multi-fold. The 
main element is that, the US represent, in the Western world, the country 
that most extensively invested in computational sciences, leading the 
digital revolution. Social and cultural issues are at the basis of such trend 
and they have been studied in several branches of scholarship. Under 
the economic point of view, a predominance of the private sector over 
the public one seems to having been the most relevant input. Similarly, 
the US scenario seems to be positively affected by the coexistence of 
strong private and public research sectors. This condition enhanced 
the development of a competitive environment, promoting a faster and 
wider application of computational modelling also in social sciences.62
A second element is but legal, and it is twofold. First. The areas 
of private and criminal justice are inherently distinct in any jurisdiction, 
as the latter is mostly based on oral hearings. This is true also in the US.63 
However, the massive number of guilty pleas reduces remarkably the 
room for oral trials in front of the courts, reducing the oral activity at the 
disposition hearing, in which the judge delivers a decision on sentencing. 
This trend caused a ‘bureaucratic effect’, transforming the oral hearing – 
being traditionally the stage for intense, human performances, into a 
more bureaucratical proceeding, concentrating the judicial discretion in 
the sole moment of sentencing. In such a context, the need for a more 
efficient management of data became relevant, inducing an enlargement 
of the recurs to risk assessment methods. 
Second. The turn of the American penal doctrine from a rehabilitative 
paradigm to the idea of ‘just desert’,64 deeply influenced the discourse 
62 See the comprehensive analysis of Susskind Richard, The End of Lawyers?, 
OUP, Oxford 2008; see also Katz Daniel M., Quantitative Legal Prediction, cit., 
pp. 909 ff.
63 See Christin Angèle, Algorithms in practice, cit., p. 8 reporting an interview 
with a clerk in an American local court: “here at the criminal side it’s messy... 
It’s not like on the civil side. Lawyers, Das, they negotiate, they decide on the 
plea... They do not kwon what’s going to happen. They scribble down notes 
on paper sheets, they couldn’t switch to paperless!”.
64 See Dubber Markus, Hörnle Tatyaina, Criminal Law. A Comparative Approach, 
OUP, Oxford, 2016, 4. The same trend, however, affected also the English 
system: see Padfiled Nicola, Morgan Rod, Maguire Mike, Out of Court, out of 
sight? Criminal sanctions and non-judicial decision-making, in M. Maguire, R. 
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about incarceration and inhabilitation, determining increasing rates of 
incarcerations.65 This implied, on the correctional point of view, more room 
for the development of computational models meant to grant a more objective 
and effective management of the stage of the execution of penalties. 
In Europe, the use of negotiated justice is not predominant. 
Although the majority of the European jurisdictions provide for some kind 
of negotiation between the prosecution and the defence,66 almost based on 
a reduction of the sanction against a very early definition of the proceeding, 
the trial still represents the most common development in criminal cases, 
leaving room for oral hearings, with oral discussion and oral presentation of 
evidence... More unpredictable variables distinguish the typical European 
criminal court context from the American one. At the same time, European 
jurisdictions are strongly rooted into the rehabilitation doctrine: the 
blueprint of correctional policies is theoretically based on individualised 
approach, against the efficiency model promoted in the US.
In conclusion, I suggest that, for the reasons presented above, the 
European context must be considered an autonomous area of investigation 
within the discourse about computational models, AI and systems of 
criminal justice, especially because of the remarkable framework for the 
protection of fundamental rights, established in Europe in the second 
WW aftermath.
3.3 sPecific imPlicAtions of stAre decisis
However, within the European scenario itself, there are other 
specificities that may impinge on the reflection about if and how 
Morgan, R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 5th ed., OUP, 
2012, (955-985) p. 974.
65 Wacquant Loic, The great penal leap backward: Incarceration in America from 
Nixon to Clinton, in J. Pratt, D. Brown, M. Brown, S. Hallsworth, W. Morrison 
(eds.), The New Punitiveness. Trends, theories, perspectives, Willan Publish-
ing, Cullompton, 2005, p. 5 (3-26), reporting the US incarceration rate being, 
since the early 70s of the last Century, two or three times that of the major 
European countries.
66 Quattrocolo Serena, Ruggeri Stefano (eds.), Personal participation in crimi-
nal proceedings, Springer 2019, p. 467.
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computational models and AI should be used in criminal proceedings. 
An important distinction exists between common-law and civil-law 
jurisdictions, having important repercussion on the topic at stake.
As said, one of the most remarkable effects of the use of 
computational model in justice systems is the impact of predictability – 
praised by the many advocates of open data instruments, but also deeply 
coveted by lawyers – on the value of the precedent. Under this point 
of view, the English system traditionally relies on the principle of stare 
decisis which is mostly unfamiliar to the civil law tradition. Goodhart 
considered it “the distinctive feature of the common law system”, and, 
thus, the “fundamental distinction between the English and the Continental 
legal method”.67 Despite the progressive realignment between the two 
legal families, over the years, having been theorised by the some of the 
most prominent comparativists,68 this aspect still plays a remarkable 
distinction between the English jurisdictions and the continental ones.69 
Although there is no room for a more accurate reconstruction here, it 
is worth highlighting that the absence of stare decisis reflects a different 
structure of the higher Courts on the continent, which is inherent to the 
analysis that will follow. The number, the inner divisions, the functions 
of continental higher court is unavoidably intermingled with the value 
and the role of the precedent: the civil law ‘model’ implies a more diffuse 
authority of those organs and their decisions.70 Moreover, the continental 
courts cannot rely on the writ of certiorari and have to hear – in a general 
sense - all the cases brought before them… and huge numbers mean less 
accessibility!71 The relevance of such remark is patent. Delving on the 
67 Goodhart Arthur L., Precedent in English and Continental Law, in Law Quar-
terly Review, 1934, 40-65, p. 42.
68 Zweigert Konrad, Kötz Hein, Einfürung in die Rechtsvergleichung, auf dem 
Gebiete des Privatsrechts, I, JCB Mohr Verlag, Tübingen, 1971, p. 314 ff.
69 See Cappelletti Mauro, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: A Fun-
damental Difference – or no Difference at All?, in H. Bernstein, U. Drobnig, H. 
Kötz, Festschrift für Konrad Zweigert zum 70. Geburstag, JCB Mohr Verlag, 
Tübingen, 1981, p. 383.
70 Cappelletti Mauro, The Doctrine, cit., 383.
71 Although not recent, an enlightening work is that collected in a special num-
ber of the Revue international de droit comparé, by Bellet Pierre, Tunc An-
dré, Touffait Adplphe, La cour judiciaire suprème, Economica, Paris, 1978. 
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value of predictability implies distinguishing between the common law 
system courts and the civil law ones. Also recruitment and conditions 
of independence of judiciary are crucial for this topic.72 The continental 
tradition of the bureaucratic state deeply influenced the structure of 
judiciary in the main European countries allowing for the Montesquieu’s 
classical theory to flourish: judiciary still is, in many of those countries, 
an independent body of civil servants, recruited by public selection, 
who will progress in their career based on seniority, a feature that still 
marks a deep difference with the Anglo-American system, especially 
with regard to the highest courts.73 The sketched background justifies 
the fact that the continental judge “develops skills in technical rather 
than in policy-oriented decision-making.74 In such context, the civil law 
supreme court judges tend towards anonymity and their names do not 
emerge in bold relief. 
However, it is worth highlighting that, comparing the European 
scenario with the US one, from the angle of the use of AI in criminal 
law, some further distinctions are due within the European area it-self. 
Some European jurisdiction provide for a jury trial, at least in some most 
serious cases, based on the traditional bifurcation between adjudication 
(fact finding) and ruling matters of law.75 One of the latter is sentencing, 
See, in particular, on this point, Tunc André, Conclusion: la cour supreme 
idéale, p. 441 ff.
72 See Zweigert Konrad, Kötz Hein, Einfürung in die Rechtsvergleichung, cit., p. 
139 (this part of the book is reproduced and translated into the English edi-
tion, by T. Weir, An Introduction to Comparative Law, OUP, 1998, p. 124 ff.); 
For a more recent overview on some of the most influential European juris-
dictions, see, Delmas-Marty Mireille, Spencer John (eds.), European Criminal 
Procedures, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, 81 ff.
73 Cappelletti Mauro, The Doctrine, cit., p. 387 and 393, where he affirms that 
the topic of confronting the two traditions needs to be approached under 
multi-fold aspects: “institutions and their organisations, bias and traditions, 
sociological backgrounds and attitudes of those who run the ‘machinery’”.
74 See Cappelletti Mauro, cit., p. 387.
75 See Langbein John H., Bifurcation and the bench, in P. Brand, J. Getzler, Judges 
and Judging in the History of the Common Law and Civil Law, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 2012. p. 67 ff. (See the interesting critical remark: “A 
judge who is kept away from fact-ﬁnding is so remote from the core function of 
adjudication that he is only peripherally responsible for the court’s decision.”
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applying the just penalty to convicted. At the present time, the distinction 
between verdict and sentence is very clear in the Anglo-American 
criminal jurisdictions (see England for the most serious cases, before 
the Crown Court),76 where the judge determines the sanction after the 
fact finding has been dealt with. However, this cannot be considered a 
distinguishing feature of the common-law, as some European continental 
countries, like France, provide for jury verdict, for serious cases, followed 
by judicial sentencing. 
For the purposes of this study, the topic has a specific relevance. 
In fact, courts in sentencing, may rely on a different set of information, 
from the one used for fact-finding.77 On the one hand, there may be 
insufficient factual evidence, if the trial concentrated on legal issues. 
On the other hand, there may be no trial and no formal evidence at all, 
as a consequence of a guilty plea. Determining the basis for sentencing 
is crucial and in some jurisdictions there may be exclusions, from the 
file, of information and materials that could be relevant in sentencing, 
but cannot be considered for the fact-finding decision-making process. 
This is the case of psychological assessment, that, in some jurisdictions, 
like Italy, for instance, is prohibited in fact-finding and allowed only at 
the correctional stage.78 
This could be an example of limitation in using tools predicting 
violent behaviour and recidivism. As said above, such software are 
rooted into a psycho-criminological theory, whose scientific reliability 
must be assessed in court. Nevertheless, no evaluation based on 
76 A full reconstruction of the English sentencing powers falls out of the scope 
here. Two aspects are worth highlighting, in these general remarks: on the 
one hand, the huge range of cases in which criminal sanctions are not applied 
by courts, rather by other public “agents who also have the role of keep-
ing order, investigation, or preparing cases for prosecution”. On the other 
hand, having regard to formal sentencing, the “relentless frequency” of the 
sentence legislation over the recent years, beside the growth of guidelines, 
delivered today by the Sentencing Council, established by the Coroner and 
Justice Act 2009 (Ashworth Andrew, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 6th ed., 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 12 and 21).
77 See Ashworth Andrew, Sentencing, cit., p. 424.
78 Art. 220.2 of the Code of criminal procedure prevents expert witness on 
character (allowing it for psychiatrics) during the trial stage. It is allowed at 
the correctional stage. 
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psycho-criminological assessment would be admitted, e.g., in Italy, 
for fact finding and sentencing. 
4. conclusions
This general overview was aimed to focus the attention on the 
most relevant risks hidden in the ‘uncontrolled’ action of computational 
modelling and AI interaction on the criminal law realm, with regard to 
the civil law jurisdictions and, in particular, to Europe. As said, at the 
time being, the rush is not in giving answers but in starting posing the 
right questions. Why do we need computational modelling and AI in our 
court rooms? Can they improve the quality of criminal justice? Is this 
compliant with fundamental rights?
Answering these questions means urging criminal lawyers to focus 
their attention on an unknown realm, making an effort to understand 
risks and potentialities of the application of AI to criminal justice. It is 
undisputed that criminal law will not be excepted by the effects of the 
more sophisticated developments of the digital turn: like any other area of 
law, also criminal law must deal with it. The rights approach seems to me 
not that of rejecting it, but to understanding advantages, limits and risks 
of it. The European jurisdictions can rely on a strong net of fundamental 
rights and procedural guarantees, deriving from the ECHR, the EU law 
and the national constitutions. Based on this, European criminal lawyers 
can face the new challenges of the so-called fourth revolution with the 
hope of preventing the risk of serious violations of fundamental rights, 
such as the presumption of innocence, the fair trial, the right to private 
life and, maybe, of exploiting the benefits that the AI may bring to our 
backlogged justice systems.
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